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In the Sttpretne Cottrt of the
State of lTtah

AMY ELIZABETH McKEE
OSTLER GREENER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

CASE
NO. 7265

THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER
and JAMES AFTEN GREENER,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for the appellant has made a statement of
facts With which we cannot entirely agree. Plaintiff filed
suit against the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener for
divorce and as an incident thereto asked for the reinstatement of certain funds which had been on deposit in certain
banking institutions in the joint names of plaintiff and •defendant until a few days prior to the filing of the complaint
(R. 2-5).
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After the defendants had been served with several orders to show cause and had subsequently filed their motion
to strike (R. 26), which said motion was granted (R. 97),
plaintiff and appellant entered her second amended complaint (R. 33-42) in which the several banks in which the
funds involved in this suit were on deposit were included
as parties defendant. Subsequently th~ case was dismissed
as to all of said banks and banking institutions heretofore
mentioned, and we feel it unnecessary to make further reference to these banks and banking institutions, except as
they may appear in connection with the discussion of the
merits of the case.
An answer was filed on behalf of the defendants Thomas Richardson Greener and James Aften Greener in which
the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener also included a
cross complaint for divorce (R. 105-108). To this answer
and cross complaint plaintiff filed a reply (R. 109-110), and
on the 17th day of May, 1948, the case came to trial on its
merits before the Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, Judge
of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County. After hearing the court issued its memorandum decision (R. 115-124), made its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 147-151), and entered its decree on August
26, 1948, denying the plaintiff a divorce and holding that
the funds in question are the sole funds of the defendant
Thomas Richardson Greener and are being held in trust
by the defendant James Aften Greener for the use and benefit of the said Thomas Richardson Greener, and ordering
the release of said funds to the defendant (R. 152).
Subsequent to the entry of the decree an order was
made upon stipulation of counsel releasing the sum of
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$1624.31 on deposit in the Springville Bank in the account
of James Aften Greener to Elmer L. Terry, one of the counsel for the defendants, as trustee, for certain uses (R. 145146) . This sum has now been depleted in accordance with
the orders of the court, to a balance of $624.31. There will
be another $100.00 withdrawn from said account on the
23rd of January, 1949, pursuant to said order, which will
leave a balance as of January 23, 1949, of $524.31. The
balance of the funds, by stipulation of counsel, were ordered deposited in time accounts in four separate banks
in Utah County (R. 154). These accounts, in· the total sum
of $18,271.08, have been reduced by the following sums:
$600.00 to plaintiff's counsel for attorneys' fees on appeal,
$86,80 costs of transcript for plaintiff, $80.82 costs of printing plaintiff and appellant's brief, $400.00 to apply on attorneys' fees for defendants' attorneys, and $43.40 costs
of transcript for defendants, leaving a balance in saiq time
accounts of $17,062.87.

The foregoing are all of the funds involved in this proceeding, notwithstanding reference to other and different
amounts mentioned by counsel for appellant in his brief.
The plaintiff and the defendant Thomas Richardson
Greener, hereinafter referred to as Greener, prior to the
filing for divorce as above set out, were residents of Springville, Utah County, Utah. The plaintiff is -a woman of the
age of 65 years (Tr. 40), and Greener was 81 years of age
January 13, 1949 (Tr. 112). Both the plaintiff and Greener
had been previously married, and both had raised families
by previous spouses, and all of the children have reached
their majority.
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For some time prior to the marriage of plain tiff and
defendant, which marriage took place in Salt Lake City
on the 2nd day of October, 1946 (Tr. 10), the plaintiff and
the defendant Greener kept company together and various
conversations were had concerning Greener's ability to provide for the plaintiff. Among other things Greener told
the plaintiff that if she would marry him that she would
never have to go on old age pension (Tr. 102), but the evidence fails to reveal that any premarital agreement was
ever entered into.
At the time of the marriage of plaintiff and Greener
the plaintiff owned a home in Springville, Utah (Tr. 44),
where she had been living with her sister for several years.
At that time she was drawing old age pension (Tr. 44, 4748). The defendant Greener had been a farmer all his life
until his retirement, and during some 35 years while he was
living with his first wife, through rigid economy and scrupulous savings, they had accumulated a home in Springville,
some United States War Bonds, and the funds involved in
this proceeding, which, after his wife's death, became his
sole property (R. 112, Tr. 123).
Shortly after the marriage plaintiff and Greener went
to Salt Lake City and Provo, and the defendant caused the
plaintiff's name to be entered on each of the savings accounts owned by him, and from that time on until after
the first divorce their names appeared on said accounts as
Thomas R. Greener or Amy E. Greener (R. 112-114).
The defendant Greener during his lifetime was closemouthed concerning his financial affairs, and until his marriage with the plaintiff even his children did not know the
extent of his holdings (Tr. 102-103, R. 116).
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Shortly after the marriage of plaintiff and Greener, defendant's children learned of defendant's holdings and of
the fact that plaintiff's name had been entered on the bank
records. Considerable difficulty arose between the plaintiff and Greener, and they determined to secure a divorce.
They conversed as to the amount of money the defendant
Greener should give to the plaintiff, and finally settled on
the sum of $2,000. They then went to the offices of Mr.
Roylance and Mr. Terry, who represented Mrs. Greener,
and filed sUit for divorce. It was difficult for counsel to
find grounds upon which to base a divorce. None were
found for the defendant, and the action was eventually filed
on December 17, 1946, in which the plaintiff herein sued
the defendant Greener for a divorce on the grounds of impotency of the defendant (Tr. 79-80, 87-88).
A decree was entered in that action on December 19,
1946 (Tr. 23) and (R. 148-149). Plaintiff received the sum
of $2,000 in cash, and thereafter the parties went to Salt
Lake City and had the plaintiff's name withdrawn from
all of the accounts (R. 113, 149).
Plaintiff used this $2,000 in modernizing and remodeling her own home (R. 149).
From that time until April 3, 1947, the parties lived
separate and apart, but communicated with each other at
various times respecting the resumption of their marital
status. On that date the parties appeared in court and requested that the decree be set aside and the action dismissed.
Such was the order of the court, and thereafter the parties
again went to Salt Lake City and plaintiff's name was re~
entered upon the records and passbooks of the depositories.
Difficulty again arose between the parties, and the defend-
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ant, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, withdrew all of the funds and turned them over to his son,
James Aften Greener, hereafter referred to as Aften, who
was made a party to this action (R. 149) .
The resumption of the marital relationship and thereentry of the plaintiff's name on the passbooks and their
agreement to begin again where they had left off was undertaken upon the same conditions and in the same manner as the marriage in the first instance (Tr. 54-55).
On December 22, 1947, there was on deposit in the
various accounts in Salt Lake City, Utah, the sum of $18,
151.46 (R. 113). In addition thereto there was also a joint
checking account in the Springville Banking Company in
Springville, Utah. The deposit books were kept in the bookcase in the home of the parties, within easy access of the
plaintiff, but that nevertheless plaintiff at no time claimed
any interest in such fund or in said checking account, nor
did she at any time write any checks against said checking
account or make any withdrawals from the savings account
(Tr. 54, 107).
Although plaintiff claimed to have made inquiry at
each of the depositories as to whether placing her name on
the· records and passbooks gave her the same rights as the
defendant had, no such inquiry was ever made (Tr. 51-53,
107, R. 149).
Although Greener testified that he had transferred his
money to the defendant Aften, and that he had no other
property other than his home (Tr. 112, 124), nevertheless
he at no time refused to support the plaintiff, nor did he at
any time fail to support her until after all the funds were
all impounded by the court and after the bonds were all
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exhausted, and during all of this time it would have been
possible for the defendant to have supported the plaintiff
(Tr.. 13~-140).
The defendant Greener did not state to the plaintiff
that he would feed her and that was all she would get, but
on the other hand told her " I will feed you and give you
all you want if you will stay here" (Tr. 110-111).
The testimony is conflicting as to whether or not the
defendant Greener made the statement about there being
three less people in the world, but if the same were made
the fact is clear that it was not communicated to the plaintiff until after the plaintiff filed her complaint and this action commenced (Tr. 87).
The sole purpose and intention of the parties in placing
the plaintiff's name on the various bank books of the depos_itories was to avoid probate, and neither of the parties
at any time considered that plaintiff owned any present interest in said funds (Tr. 122, 130). The defendant is the
sole 0\vner of the funds referred to as on deposit in the
various depositories, and his withdrawing them was not
fraudulent, and constituted no cruelty as against the plaintiff (R. 150).
At no time during said marriage has the plaintiff been
denied by the defendant any necessities of life, nor has the
defendant at any time denied the plaintiff any requested
requirements for her personal needs (Tr. 48-49, 109-110).
In addition thereto, there were in the home of the parties
on various occasions small luxuries, such as candy and
fruits (Tr. 97).
The defendant further told the plaintiff when she was
about to leave him that this was her home, and she could
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stay there, and that he would supply her everything she
wanted (Tr. 146, 110-111, R. 150).
The defendant at no time during the said marriage
held the plaintiff up to ridicule or shame, nor did he at any
time do any act or fail to do any act which he could have
done which could have caused the plaintiff mental anguish
or bodily suffering, and at no time during said marriage
between plaintiff and defendant did the defendant wield a
knife or make any threats toward the plaintiff, nor did- the
defendant commit any other acts of violence during said
marriage (Tr. 109) .
Plaintiff did make a trip to California on or about December 20, 1947, and at such time defendant Greener gave
her ample funds to defray her expenses, and she returned
with $5.00 unspent (Tr. 117, R. 150).
Although defendant Greener filed a cross complaint,
he later stated that he did not want a divorce, and that he
was willing to resume marital relations (Tr. 147-148, 154).
ARGUl\:IENT

Counsel for the appellant, in their brief, have gone to
great lengths in pointing out the apparent contradictions
in the defendant Greener's testimony. The complete answer to this is that the testimony must be viewed in its entirety, with relation to the issues in the case. We might
take the time of the court, and added space, in our brief
in pointing out just as numerous and as serious contradicti~ns _i~. the plaintiff's testimony with respect to vital facts,
but likewise. we think this testimony should be considered
as a whole in relation to the issues of the case.
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We suggest to this Court, as stated in numerous decisions, that the trial court is in a better position to consider the demeanor of the witnesses in order to reconcile
any apparent inconsistencies, and that in our case the trial
court has resolved any such discrepancies in favor of the
defendants and respondents.
Counsel for the appellant have made fifteen different
assignments of error. We find, however, only twelve of
them discussed in their argument-assignments numbered
5, 6 and 12 having been ommitted. We feel that a number
of these assignments are practically identical with other
assignments, and that a!l of them might be discussed under
three points which we feel are the only issues involved in
this case.
I

Did the trial court err in holding that plaintiff was not
entitled to a decree of divorce?
II
Did the trial court err in failing to award to the plaintiff any of the money contained in the bank accounts heretofore mentioned?
III
Did the trial court err in failing to award to plaintiff's
counsel attorney's fees and costs?
In the discussion of the issues in the case as referred
to above, we think it necessary to keep in mind that this
is a divorce case, and that the matters with respect to the
moneys on deposit in various banks involved in this litigation is merely incidental to the main issue of divorce, and
that if this Court sustains the decree of the trial court no
further orders or decrees with respect to the money in-
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volved herein are necessary or proper, except that the
same be released to the defendants. It was upon this theory. that the case was tried to the court below, and this is
supported by the Idaho court in Trader v. Trader (Idaho
1930) 285 P. 678. We also call the Court's atteniton to
Murray v. Murray (Cal. 1896) 47 P. 37. In the latter case,
even though the plaintiff had designated the matter concerning the transfer of property as a separate cause of action, the court still said it was all one cause of action for
n1aintenance.
I

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF
DIVORCE?
Appellant's counsel, in their brief, have claimed six
acts of cruelty upon which they base their contention that
the plaintiff and appellant is entitled to a divorce. We will
discuss these in the same order.
A.

The claimed fraudulent conveyance.

There is nothing in this record to show that the defendant at any time after the transfer of the funds as above
set out could not have secured sufficient means with which
to amply provide for the plaintiff. On the contrary, she
was fully supported until the parties separated (Tr. 48-49),
and subsequently thereto until the present time, she has
received $50.00 per month under order of the court.
The testimony further shows that even after the transfer of the funds the defendant Greener testified that he
could have received sufficient money from Aften to amply
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provide for plaintiff (Tr. 139-140). This is undisputed in
the record.
Counsel argues at great length that the withdrawal of
the funds and the transfer of the same to Aften Greener
was a fraudulent act, and cite in support thereof the cases
of Trader v. Trader, and Murray v. Murray, supra. A careful examination of these cases shows that the action was
brought on the grounds of desertion and failure to provide.
In each case there had already been a violation of the right
to support, and the court in each case bases its decision on
this violation, which was an already accomplished fact, and
not something to be imagined or conjectured about. In the
case at bar, the plaintiff had received from the defendant
a good home, all the necessities of life, and whatever she
wanted, even though she had had to ask for the same.
There had been no violation of any marital right by the defendant, even though he had withdrawn the funds on deposit and transferred the same to his son.
We further wish to call the Court's attention to the
facts in Trader v. Trader, supra. It went to the Supreme
Court upon a dismissal after the plaiiltiff declined to amend
after the sustaining of a motion by the defendants. Even
in that case where, as above stated, it arose upon a failure
to provide, the court did not actually hold the conveyance
to be fraudulent, but merely sent the same back for a new
trial.
These cases cited by counsel in their brief utterly fail
to sustain their contention on this point. In support of this
same contention, appellant's counsel cite Petty v. Petty
(Idaho 1946) 168 P. 2d 818. A careful reading of this case
shows that the facts are so dissimilar to the facts of the
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case at bar that it can have no value. This was a case in
which the minor child was attempting to force a reconveyance of property conveyed by his father. We wish to point
out that even here the court did not actually find that the
conveyance was fraudulent. The case is decided on the
basis of a statute allowing amendments, and is reversed to.
allow the defendants to amend their pleadings. In any
event, it involves the right of a minor to support by his
father, which can not be compared with the marital right
of the plaintiff, who has in this case filed suit for divorce
and might, under rules laid down in Pinnion v. Pinnion (92
Utah, 255) be denied any right to further alimony or support, depending upon the circumstances surrounding the
marriage.
Appellant also relies upon the case of LeStrange v.
LeStrange (1934) 242 App. Div. 74( 273 N. Y. S. 21) to
support her contention that the withdrawal of the funds by
Greener was fraudulent, contending that this extinguished
the right of inheritance of the plaintiff. In the LeStrange
case, however, there was no action for divorce, and the
husband appeared and testified as a witness on behalf of
the plaintiff. It appeared that the marriage at the time
the suit was brought was satisfactory, and that the husband and wife therein were living happily together. The
court seemed to rely heavily upon this fact, saying:
"There has been no interruption of the marital
relation, and the wife testified that they were living
happily together at the time of the trial. The three
sons are the only litigants seeking to support the trust
agreement.''
It further appeared from the facts in LeStrange v.
LeStrange, supra, that the husband had been subject to co-
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ercion and pressure by his children to set up the trust
agreement involved in that action. The appellant in the
case at bar has attempted to extinguish any right of inheritance she may have had by filing a complaint for divorce. There is no intention on her part to live with the
defendant tmtil her right of inheritance matures. Hence,
her claim that the withdrawal of the funds violated that
right is without foundation, and the case of LeStr-ange v.
LeStrange, supra, has no application to the contention of
the appellant that the withdrawal of the fw1ds was fraudulent.
Counsel for appellant next cite Payne v. Tatem
(1930) 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2. Again we point out
to the Court that this case deals with the right of inheritance, and the decision of the court was to the effect that
the gift should be set aside only to the extent of the wife's
distributive share in her husband's estate.
The court further indicates that had evidence been
produced as- to the source of the funds involved, the decision may have been different, even as to the wife's distributive share. It therefore follows that this case has no application with respect to the matter of fraud in withdrawing
the funds by the defendant in the case at bar.
Counsel then cite Blodgett v. Blodg.ett (1932) 266 Ill.
App. 517, to support their contention of fraud. In this case
the plaintiff was seeking to recover property fraudulently transferred by her husband during. his lifetime. The
only distinguishing feature in this case is that the husband
was found to be guilty of forgery, along with his brother and
sister, in the transactions complained of. In any event,
the case again dealt with the surviving widow's right to in-
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heritance, and therefore, in our view, has no application.
We next discuss the case cited by appellant of Bodner
v. Feit (1936) 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S. 814. The
facts in this case, we think are so dissimilar to the one at
bar that it can have no application to the point under discussion. We do, however, point out that in this case and
in all the New York cases the decisions are colored by special decedent's estate statutes in which dower is entirely
abolished and certain rights in lieu thereof set up to take
effect after death. It is interesting to note in this case that
Justice Untermyer wrote a very well reasoned dissenting
opinion, in which he contends that, even under their statutes, a husband has the right to convey his property, and
that there would be no fraud whatever in so doing, and he
cites a number of cases to that effect.
It would, therefore, seem that the cases heretofore discussed clearly enunciate the doctrine that before a transfer of funds or property can be considered fraudulent, it
must have violated a marital right, and that violation
must have occurred at the time the transfers are complained
of. In the case at bar, as we have previously shown, there
was no violation of any marital right at the time this action was commenced.

We will later discuss in more detail plaintiff's claimed
interest in the funds on deposit. We turn now to the question posed by appellant's counsel on page 26 of their brief,
DID THE ACT AMOUNT TO CRUELTY? We feel that
that question is fully answered in the negative by plaintiff
in her testimony on cross examination. We refer to page
56 of the transcript, where her testimony was as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
"Q. Now you told counsel, Mrs. Greener, that you have
been made nervous and extremely unhappy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that all because of the fact Mr. Greener had
failed to give you any money, or is it because of the fact
that you weren't getting along?
A. Well I guess it was because we wasn't getting
along, and the things, the threats he would make and that.
Q. So your paramount interest in this thing wasn't
the money in the banks?
A. No sir. I pron1ised him and he promised me if
we went back to one another we would be honest with one
another, and he wasn't honest with me.
Q. Did you- promise to be a good wife to him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And to take care of him and help him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you think you have done that?
A. Yes sir, I do."
It is quite obvious from the foregoing statements of

the plaintiff that there could be no cruelty arising from the
transfer of the funds by Greener, inasmuch as there was
no mental anxiety or unhappiness caused thereby ..
B. The alleged accusation of

r~bbing

him of $2,000.

In considering plaintiff's allegation that the defendant
Greener accused her of robbing him of $2,000, we must
first determine whether or not the plaintl.ff has carried her
burden of proving that the statement was made, and if it
were made, whether it caused her great mental distress or
suffering, and whether or not it held her up to ridicule and
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shame. The only evidence in the record that Greener ever
made such an accusation was the plaintiff's statement to
that effect, and as against that we have Greener's denial
(Tr. 115). Appellant's counsel points out that Greener in
open court made the statemen.t that the plaintiff robbed
him of $2,000. We suggest that this was after plaintiffs
amended complaint was filed, and could not have caused her
any ridicule, shame, and great mental suffering or anguish,
such as would support the allegations in her complaint. We
therefore submit that the plaintiff has failed with respect
to this allegation in carrying the burden of proof necessary
to establish the fact that this accusation was made, and
that even if the same had been made, that she suffered any
great mental anguish, or was held up to ridicule or shame.
C.

Alleged constant quarr.eling over return of $2,000.

We suggest that, in connection with this allegation,
the court failed to find anything concerning the quarreling
over $2,000 that would constitute cruelty, and there is certainly nothing in the record to justify a finding that such
ever did take place, or that the plaintiff suffered any mental distress thereby.
In the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152

P. 2d 426, cited by counsel for appellant in their brief, we
wish to quote from the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Wolfe, at pages 154-155, as follows:
"A wise trial judge with an understanding of human nature and a sympathy toward the plight of the
parties will sense from the evidence whether the relationship is worth trying to salvage or whether it were
better to permit each to go his own way and what the
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effect would be mentally and physically on the parties
if the relationship continued. That is why contrast
or comparison of this with seemingly similar cases may
not be worth much. In divorce cases especially, seeing
the parties in court, noting how they react to each
other, inadequate as is such opportunity when compared to what might be ascertained by an observer of
the whole dran1a of the marriage, is still immeasurably
superior to our merely viewing the cold record."
D. Alleged threats by Greener. E.

Alleged knife e.pisode.

Again we submit that the only evidence of threats and
the knife episode are the statements.of the plaintiff, which
were denied by Greener (Tr. 109), and the court found that
the knife episode never occurred, and that there were no
threats as clainled by plaintiff (R. 122-~23, 150L
Plain.
tiff testified that the knife episode took place shortly after
the resumption of marital relations following· the first divorce (Tr. 55). This, according to her testimony, would
be near the first of -1\fay, 1947. · Yet she failed to attach
sufficient importance to the matter to make· any complaint
to anyone that such had taken place, and continued to live
with the defendant, and even asked him to accompany her
to California just before Christmas of the same year ('fr.
117). She did not make complaint until January, 1948,
after she had found that defendant had transferred the
funds on deposit in the various banks mentioned elsewhere
in this brief. Her actions and conduct from the time shortly after she went back to Greener up until the filing of the
complaint the following January testify eloquently that
"the knife- episode never did occur. · We 'think it bad. ·.taste
to characterize the plaintiff's testimony as perjury. It is
sufficient to point out the obvious inconsistency.
.
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Appellant's counsel refers to a conversation alleged
to have occurred between plaintiff's grandson and Greener.
We think it sufficient to point out that if this conversation
occurred it was never called to plaintiff's attention until
after her amended complaint for divorce was filed. In fact,
as we will show by the testimony of plaintiff's witness, Walter Mories, it is questionable whether said alleged conversation took place until after the divorce was filed. There
was no knowledge, and therefore no fear or anxiety on the
part of plaintiff by reason of this alleged conversation at
the time this divorce was commenced. She therefore cannot use this as a ground of cruelty to support the allegations in her complaint.
In support of the above, we quote from Walter Mories'
testimony on cross examination (Tr. 60):
When did you say this was, Mr. Mories?
A. It was some time after my grandmother come
from California, I don't know the date.
Q. After Christmas?
A. Yes, I believe it was after Christmas.
Q. Was it after she filed for a divorce?
A. I don't know when she filed.
Q. You don't know whether it was after or before?
A. No, I don't."
"Q.

\Ve further quote from the testimony of plaintiff on
cross examination (Tr. 86-87):
"Q. Isn't it correct that the first time you went to an
attorney or ealle.d an attorney was after you discovered
that the money had been transferred from the banks?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. And then you called first, I believe, Mr. Roylance
and you couldn't get him, and you called Mr. Sumsion; isn't

that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you talked to Mr. Sumsion you didn't
say anything about this episode you have just testified to,
about your grandson's conversation with Mr. Greener, did
you?
A. No, I didn't know about it then.
Q. And the only thing you talked about was the
banks, the money in the banks?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as a matter of fact that was the thing that
was uppermost in your mind at that time, wasn't it; isn't
that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as a matter of fact you had left Mr. Greener
and had started your divorce action before you. found anything out about this conversation with your grandson and
Mr. Greener; isn't that true?
A. Yes, sir."
F. Conversation between plaintiff and Greener about his
feeding her.

We submit that the court, in finding against the plaintiff on this matter, was amply justified. We have only the
plaintiff's statement that Greener told her she could stay
there and he would feed her and that's all she would get,
or she could get out of it, it didn't make a bit ·of difference
to him. As against this, we· have Greener's version of the
conversation, as follows (Tr. 110-111):
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"Q. Now you heard Mrs. Greener testify that, or words
to this effect, that she could stay there and you would feed
her, or she could get out, it didn't make any difference
to you. Did you make any such statement?

A. I talked with her and begged .her when she was
going, I told her to stay rigbt there. She was going home.
She wanted. me to go and get a neighbor to bring his car
and take her home. I said, ''You are home right here."
''Now," I said, "stay home and fulfill your promises that
YO:U made." Lsaid, "I will feed you and give you all you
want if you will stay here."
Q. And that is the way it happened, the way you have
testified? .
A. That's it.
Q. So you didn't say, "I will feed you and that's all
you will get" ?
A. No, ;nothing of that ever happened."
We think Greener's version of the conversation, as
above set out, is the more logical way in which it took place.
In this matter, as in the other instances heretofore discussed, the trial court had the parties before it, could
observe their demeanor, the manner in which they testified, and was .in position to determine the truth· of the testimony.
As further proof that the plaintiff. suffered no mental
distress or <:tnguish wh\le living with the defendant Greener.
we have the· testimony of ·p~lairitiff's sister, Sarah Nelson,
as follows (Tr. 68-69):
~

, "Q. And have you::be.en ·living with her ever since she
left Mr. Greener -early·in January?
A. Yes, sir.

:.
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Q.

Been living in her home?

A. Yes, sir.
Q.

I take it you were living in her home prior to that

time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now what have you observed with respect to Mr8.
Greener's action, her health, her mental condition, since
she has left Mr. Greener in January?

A. Well I have noticed that she gets up in the night
and she will cry, and her head aches so much worse, and
she is so nervous. She is terribly nervous.
Q.

Had you observed her condition prior to that

time?
A. Well, not so much, no sir.
Q. Well you did observe her prior to the time; you
had seen her quite frequently, hadn't you_?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now what was her condition prior to that time
as compared with it after she left Mr. Greener?

A. Well, I noticed her nervousness and all that since
she left more than before."
The above quoted testimony of the plaintiff's sister
clearly indicates that the mental anguish and suffering, if
any, on the part of the plaintiff occurred subsequent to
their separation, and not as a result of any acts or conduct
on the part of the defendant Greener.
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QUESTION OF WILLINGNESS OF DEFENDANT
TO RESUME MARITAL RELATIONS.
Here appellant's counsel has taken one instance in defendant's testimony and attempted to prove his point from
that statement. As appears in many other instances in his
brief, he has failed to consider the entire record, or even
the whole testimony of any one witness. At best, it is questiomible whether or not the testimony quoted by appellant's
counsel in their brief, at page 34, sustains their contention.
We· think the same can be construed to mean that marital
relations could be resumed if the two were brought together.
There are a number of statements in the record definitely
refuting counsel's argument in this regard. We refer the
Court to Greener's testimony on cross examination .(Tr.
147):
"Q.

Do you think you and Mrs. Greener could go back

and live together happily?
A. We would have to do different than we done before if we did.
Q. Unless she would do different than she did before
you couldn't maintain your relationship with her, could
you?
A. Why not?
. ~ _ Q.. Could you, unless she did something different?
A. I don't see why."
And again (Tr. 149):
Now if Mrs. Greener were to come back to you,
how would you provide for her, Mr. Greener?
A. That would be my lookout.
"Q.
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That would be your lookout?
A. Yes.
Q. You don't wish to qualify that statement to go
into it any further?
A. I would do what I said I would do. I told her that
I would give her all she wanted, when she left me the last
time. I told her if she would stay I would give her all she
wanted."
Q.

There are numerous other statements in the testimony
to like effect, and it would only prolong this brief to quote
them verbatim.
Counsel for appellant has cited several Utah cases in
support of their contention that this Court should substitute its findings for those of the trial court.· A careful reading of these cases reveals that they not only fail to sustain
their position, but, on the contrary, strongly support the
opposite. We quote from Steed v. Steed, 54 Utah 244, 181
P. 445, at pages 249-250:
"While, if we were controlled by what appears
from the fact of the record, we should feel inclined to
reverse the judgment and to grant plaintiff the relief
he seeks, yet in this, as in most cases, there are many
things that transpire at the trial which cannot be correctly reflected in cold print." * * * * "Nor, in view
of all the facts and circumstances, are the conclusions
of law and judgment so clearly wrong as to authorize
us to set them aside in a case of this kind. We feel
constrained to hold that the district court had a right
to exercise some discretion in the matter, and that it
exercised that discretion wisely."
We suggest that in the case at bar there is nothing in
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the record to justify this Court in disturbing the findings
of the trial court.
As heretofore pointed out, the appellant has failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations
set out in her second amended complaint, upon which she
relies as grounds for divorce, and has failed to meet the
requirements as laid down in Cordner v. Cordner, 91 U.
466, 61 P. 2d 601.
As heretofore mentioned, we take the position that the
question as to the rights in the funds is only incidental to the
action for the divorce, and that if the divorce be denied the
Court is no longer concerned with the rights of the parties
in those funds. However, in the event the Court does not
agree with our position, we now proceed to discuss the
issue of the relationship of the parties to the funds in question.
II

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO
A WARD TO THE PLAINTIFF ANY OF THE MONEY
CONTAJINED IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS HERETOFORE MENTIONED?
In considering the above point, it is necessary to call
the Court's attention to certain facts regarding the funds
under discussion. Prior to the marriage of plaintiff and
Greener, the latter was the sole owner of the funds above
referred to, they having been on deposit in various banks
throughout the State of Utah. They were all accumulated
by Greener and his former wife· during their long married
life· together, ·and there were no contributions by the plaintiff to said funds. It also appears that Greener at all times
had exclusive control over the funds. This is shown by the
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undisputed fact that Greener made all checks and signed the
same, and made all withdrawals from said accounts, and
that, although the passbooks were kept in the home of
plaintiff and Greener, plaintiff at no time made any atten1pt
to take them into her possession.
We further submit to the Court that at no time prior
to the separation of the parties in ..Tanuary, 1948, did the
plaintiff make any clain1 to said funds. On the contrary,
she treated them at all times as the sole property of Greener. \Ve refer the Court to the following testimony given by
plaintiff on her direct examination (Tr. 22-23):
Well now, did you have any conversation with Mr.
Greener shortly after that with respect to filing a divorce
proceeding?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was that?
A. Well, he asked me if I would get a divorce. He
said that if I would get a divorce maybe his children would
come back to him and treat him decent again. And he said,
"If you get a divorce I will help you pay for it; I will give
you more money than you have ever had in your life before," he said. And I asked him how much he had to give.
And he said, "I will give you five hundred dollars." And
I said, "No sir, I won't go for five hundred dollars." I said,
"I want a third of what you have got." And he said, "You
wouldn't get it." I said, "Would you give me five thousand
dollars?" And he said, "No." And I said, Would you give
me three thousand dollars?" And he said, "No." I said,
"Would you give me two thousand?" And he said, "Yes,
I will give you two thousand dollars if you will get the divorce.'"
"Q.
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Would the plaintiff have made such statements if she
had claimed a half interest, or any part of said funds as her
own? The answer is obvious. She would not.
The record is replete with similar instances showing
beyond all doubt that plaintiff at no time prior to the first
divorce claimed any present interest in said funds. Was
the situation any different after the resumption of marital
relations?
We again refer to the plaintiff's testimony on direct
examination (Tr. 23):
Now what occurred after that divorce?
A. Well, he came back and wanted me back. He
made those promises all over to me again. And we went
to Salt Lake and had my name put on those books again."
"Q.

In several other places the plaintiff stated that the
same promises were made to her again, indicating that the
same conditions prevailed as prior to the separation, and
that the marriage relation was resumed on the same basis
as in the beginning. One of these is as follows (Tr. 50):
But you did go to him and asked him for all that
you had, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And felt that that was the right thing to do?
"Q.

A.
Q.

Yes, sir.
Is that true all the time you lived with him?

A. Yes, sir.
Q.. That ·was the precedure .from the beginning to end,
was it?
A. Yes, sir.
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And he was still the same with respect to buying
groceries and other household necessities even up until the
time you left him?
A. Yes, sir."
Q.

vVe also have the plaintiff's direct statement as follows (Tr. 54-55) :
"Q. Then with respect to your testimony, Mrs. Greener, the situation as far as the second time you went back
to Mr. Greener was no different than the first time you
married him, was it?

..

Q.

. ..

It was the same situation, wasn't it, Mrs. Greener?

A. Yes, sir. He promised me the same things over
again that he did the first time."
Plaintiff further indicated her attitude toward these
funds in her testimony on direct examination at (Tr. 162):
"Q. Now you have heard Mr. Greener testify today that
upon the occasion of your visit to California at the end of
last year he gave you $60.00 to use as expense money for
the trip. Is that true?
A. No, sir. He gave me $30, a $30 check he wrote
out for me.
Q. Is that all he gave you?
A. He gave me my train fare.''

We further wish to point out that the last testimony
above quoted was concerning the trip to California which
was taken but a few days prior to their separation and the
filing of this divorce action.
When we add to the foregoing, the testimony of Green-
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er that the only reason for placing plaintiff's name on the
accounts was to avoid probate, and that there was no intention that she should ever have any part of such funds
prior to his death, and the further fact that although she
characterized Greener's conduct as stingy and niggardly,
she had access to the passbooks representing said accounts,
yet made no attempt to withdraw any funds from these accounts, but relied wholly upon what he was willing to give
her, and testified that she thought this was the proper thing
to do, can there be any doubt that there is clear and convincing proof sufficient to overcome any presumption that
might arise from placing the plaintiff's name on the joint
tenancy cards of .the various banks where the funds were
deposited? N.eill v. Royce, 101 U. 181, 120 P. 2d, 327.
The trial court, in holding that the test of clear and
convincing proof as required in the Neill case, supra, had
been met, made a very careful and exhaustive analysis of
that case, and the rules therein enunciated were applied to
the case at bar (R. 118 and following). The court also discussed the following, in addition to the matters hereinabove
referred to: the settlement in. the prior divorce action in
the sum of $2,000. We feel that the significance in that
settlement was the plaintiff's haggling and bargaining with
Greener, first for one-third of the funds, then for $5,000,
then for $3,000, and finally settlement for $2,000, with no
thought or mention of a one-half interest in the funds on
deposit. And further the plaintiff herself testified that the
situation was no different after the resumption of the marital relationship.
The trial court also discussed the allegation in plaintiff's complaint concerning the return of the said $2,000.
At this point we submit that had the parties considered the
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plaintiff as having any present interest in said funds, it
would have been quite unnecessary to quarrel about the
return of any amount.
Counsel relies heavily on the cases of N usshold v.
Kruschke (Ore.) 159 P. 2d 819, and Tabola v. Wholey (Cal.)
170 P. 2d. 952, 956. In the Tabola case, supra, the decision
of the court is based upon a joint venture in which both parties had contributed both in money and services to the property involved. When differences arose the one party withdrew all the funds. The court, in applying the law to these
facts, would not go behind the joint agreement. In our
opinion, this case is clearly distinguishable on its facts from
the case at bar, but in any event the rule laid down in the
case of Neill v. Uoyce, supra, which is the law in Utah, allows the court to go behind any such agreement and determine the real intentions of the parties.
In Nusshold v. Kruschke, supra, the husband, before
his death, withdrew from a joint account $5100 and placed
it in a joint account with the defendant. In reaching its
decision, the court found that there was no evidence whatever to rebut the presumption of the joint accounts. On
the contrary, it was undisputed that the money, or the
greater part thereof, came from the sale of the home, which
had been held by the plaintiff and her former husband as
tenants by the entirety. The facts in this case are so dissimilar that this decision again has no effect in determining the questions involved in the case at bar.
In further discussing the question as to whether the
plaintiff acquired any present interest in the funds, we direct the Court's attention to the case of Wood v. Wood, 87
Utah 394, 49 P. 2d 416. In this case the defendant, Jennie
Wood, deposited the funds in the bank in the name of Jo-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
seph Wood by herself as· Guardian, and the question arose
as to vyhether or not there was a valid gift which could be
enforced by the plaintiff upon reaching his majority. From
the facts therein presented the court found that no such
gift was intended, but that the account was opened so that
when the defendant died any money remaining in the ac~
count would go to the plaintiff without necessity of probate. We think this case goes far beyond anything in the
case at bar, and although not entirely identical in its facts,
yet is persuasive in determining the question under. discussion. At this point we refer to Lundgreen v. Lundgreen,
_ _ _Utah
, 184 P. 2d 670, in which the plaintiff
and defendant sought a .determination of their property
rights in a divorce proceeding. The facts in this case parallel the facts in the case at bar, in that the parties were 70
years of age and their marriage was a second marriage
and of short duration. The property involved was real estate instead of personal property, but the significance with
respect to the said property is the fact that it was held in
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, and in making
division of the property the court disregarded the joint tenancy ·as giving either party any interest therein, and considered only the fact that the original purchase price had
been paid by the plaintiff, and that the defendant had made
certain contributions toward remodeling and improvements,
and upon these two considerations the award was made.
We also direct the Court's attention to the case of
Foreman v. Foreman,
U
176 P. 2d 144, cited
by appellant's counsel in their brief. In that case also there
were bonds held in joint tenancy, as well as a joint bank account, and the court made its property award without regard to the joint interest of the parties thereto, but cited
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the case of Pinnion v. Pinnion, supra, as controlling in determining the amount of the award to the wife, irrespective of the fact that the property was in joint tenancy.
QUESTION OF ALLEGED PREMARITAL AGREEMENT.

Appellant's counsel, in their brief, contend at great
length that there was a premarital agreement, and that
appellant would not have married Greener except for the
alleged promises with respect to his property. Counsel also
spent much time and space in his brief, and has cited several cases to the effect that the statute of frauds must be
pleaded as a defense, and that the purported agreement
was without the statute of frauds. A complete answer to
this argument may be found in the record of the testimony
itself, in which the plaintiff stated that she did not marry
Greener for his money, nor because of any agreement in
connection therewith, but because they had promised each
other that they would live together as a husband and wife
should. We refer the Court to plaintiff's testimony on direct examination (Tr. 18):
Now I ask you at this time, Mrs. Greener, whether
you would have married Mr. Greener if it hadn't been for
this promise to turn this money over to you?
A. Yes,-A. Yes, I would have married him the first time without promises of the money."
"Q.

And again on cross examination (Tr. 43-44):
"Q.

A.

And he told you he had thirty thousand?
Yes, sir.
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And he told you it was in the banks?
Yes, sir.
Q. At that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Told you which banks it was in?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in what form it was in, as far as accounts
were concerned, did he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.

A.

Is that the reason you married him at that time?
A. Well no, not the first time it wasn't for his money
I. married him.
Q. So you married him because you wantec,l to marry
him and live with him at that time?
A. And take care of him like he wanted me to.
Q. And take care of him and be a good wife to him,
is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was the only thing you had in mind then,
wasn't it Mrs. Greener?
A. Yes, sir."
Q..

And again on cross examination (Tr. 46-47):
And didn't you promise him then you would come
back and make him a good wife?
A. Yes, after these other things he had promised me,
these other promises, I made him that promise.
Q. You promised that. That is, you wouldn't want
to have come back, come and live with him unless you could
have congenial marriage relations, would you?
A. I don't know what you mean.
"Q.
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Q. If you knew you weren't going back and live like
a man and wife should, you wouldn't have gone back,
would you?
A. No, sir; we made them pron1ises to one another
that that is what we would do."

\Ve further at this time direct the Court's attention
to the testimony of the plaintiff, heretofore quoted, in which
she stated that the situation was no different after the resumption of the marital relations than it was before. Upon
these and all other testimony of the plaintiff heretofore
set out, as well as the entire record itself, we submit that
the appellant has wholly failed to prove any premarital
agreement upon which any present rights in the funds referred to could be based.
QUESTION OF IMPRESSING A TRUST IN FAVOR
OF GREENER.
The foregoing, under the rule laid down in Neill v.
Royce, supra, leaves no room for doubt that the plaintiff
acquired no interest in the funds on deposit in the various
banks as herein discussed, and that the trial court committed no error in holding that the funds were the sole property of the defendant Greener, and as an incident thereto
Aften holds the same in trust for Greener. We feel that
this could very well settle the entire matter. We will proceed, however, to a brief discussion of the argument by
counsel for appellant on the question of impressing the
funds with a trust in favor of Greener. Appellant's counsel argue that the trial court in effect dismissed the cross
complaint of Greener, and that there is nothing in the pleadings upon which to base any affirmative relief on behalf
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of either the defendant Greener or the defendant Aften.
We need only refer the Court to the answer filed in behalf
of both defendants, and particularly that part of the prayer
as shown at (R. 108), which reads as follows: "Cross complainant prays for such other and further relief as to the
Court may seem just and equitable." Counsel for appellant refers to the court's finding No. 14, and assumes the
same to have dismissed the entire pleading. This seems
to us to be an unwarranted stretch of the imagination,
as the court merely found that the defendant Greener wants
no divorce, and is willing to resume marital relations (R.
150).
We here call the Court's attention to the case of Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10, cited in appellant's brief to sustain their contention that no relief could be granted the defendant Greener. As we have heretofore pointed out, the
defendants, in their answer, asked for general relief, and
we quote from W~elwright v. Roman, supra, as follows:
"That, in case general relief only is asked, any relief that is supported by the pleadings, and the evidence
may be granted, is well settled."
As to the case of Cain v. Stewart, et ux., 47 U. 160, also
cited in appellant's brief to support the same contention, we
suggest' that this case has no application to the point under
discussion. This case merely holds that a judgment for
more money than is prayed for cannot be sustained. The
court merely said in effect that the trial court must have
made a mistake in its arithmetic, and sent the case back
with instructions to figure the correct amount and enter
judgment accordingly.
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Another case upon which appellant relies is the case of
Saint v. Saint (Cal. 1932) 7 P. 2d 374. Counsel for appellant, in discussing this case, state at page 38 of their brief:
"the court in setting aside the conveyance as
fraudulent said."
We disagree with counsel that the court in this case set
aside any conveyance or transfer of property, and we point
out that this case would only have application in the case
at bar, first, if there were actual fraud on the part of Greener, which we have shown did not exist, and, second, if Greener were suing Aften to establish a trust. There is no controversy between defendants Greener and Aften. On the
contrary, Aften has acquiesced in the trial court's decision
and has joined with defendant Greener as respondent, to
uphold the decision of the lower court.
Again in the analysis of the case of Jolly v. Graham,
22 Ill. 550, 78 N. E. 919, relied upon heavily by the appellant, we suggest in that case, first, that there was no doubt
concerning the fraud committed, and second, that the plaintiffs were heirs of the party who committed the fraud, and
hence had no greater rights than the transferor would have
had had he been the complainant. Therefore, to make this
case applicable the defendant Greener would have had to
enter suit against his son Aften, and we refer to our remarks above in connection with Saint v. Saint, supra.
In our argument herein we have shown beyond all
doubt that the funds were the sole property of Greener,
therefore whether or not a trust is impressed upon the funds
in favor of Greener should be of no concern to the appellant.
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III
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS?
We think it unnecessary to point out the amount of
work performed by counsel on either side of this case. The
only question, it would seem to us, is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the appellant an attorney's fee. We call the Court's attention to the fact that
counsel for appellant did receive the sum of $100.00 as fees
in the proceedings prior to the appeal in this case. An
-award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is entirely within
the discretion of the trial court, even when the plaintiff is
the prevailing party. The trial court in the case at bar
exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff any further
attorney's fees in its decree. Appellant has pointed out
p.othing in this case to show an abuse of such discretion,
especially in view of the fact that the defendants were the
prevailing parties.
Counsel's position that $1,000.00 was stipulated as a
reasonable fee for _the services of plaintiff's counsel on appeal is not quite correct. Respondents' counsel did indicate that no objection would be raised to $1;000.00 attorneys' fees for the entire appeal, provided, that counsel for
appellant is entitled to be paid by the defendant any fee at
all. We take the view that the defendants should not be
required to pay any fees for appellant's counsel, but that
she should pay her own counsel fees. We think there was
no error committed by the trial court with respect to this
matter.
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CONOLUSION
In conclusion, we submit that this is a divorce case,
and that the rights in the funds involved are merely incidental thereto. We further submit to the Court that the
evidence was ample to support the trial court's findings
that the plaintiff had not sustained her burden of proof
with respect to her action for divorce, and was not entitled
to any part of the funds in controversy, nor is she entitled
to the imposition of a trust on any part of said funds for
her benefit, and that she should pay her own counsel fees,
costs and expenses.
We also submit that the application of the equitable
doctrine of "clean hands" has reference only to the plaintiff or other party commencing an action, and can have
no effect upon the defendants in this case, who were
brought into court by the appellant, and we suggest that
the appellant had better carefully scrutinize her own conduct, which is apparent in the record of this case. It necessarily follows that the findings and decree of the trial court
should be sustained and affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE
ELMER L. TERRY
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
Received....______Copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondents, this
day of January, A. D. 1949.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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